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NO. 31 APRIL 2021 Introduction 
Germany, the EU and Global Britain: 
So Near, Yet So Far 
How to Link “Global Britain” to European Foreign and Security Policy 
Claudia Major and Nicolai von Ondarza 
Under the narrative of “Global Britain”, the United Kingdom (UK) aims to position 
itself after Brexit as an independent leading power with global reach. The Integrated 
Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published in March 
2021, seeks to implement this goal. By making the G7 and COP26 presidencies in 2021 
a success and by increasing its defence spending, London wants to show what Global 
Britain means in practice, while also convincing the new US administration of its stra-
tegic value. With regard to the European Union (EU), however, the Johnson govern-
ment rejects institutionalised cooperation in foreign and security policy and prefers 
flexible formats with individual EU states. This presents Germany with a dilemma: 
On the one hand, it wants to involve London in European foreign and security policy, 
but on the other hand, this involvement must not be at the expense of the EU and 
European unity. In view of the currently strained EU-UK relationship, institutional-
ised cooperation only seems possible in the long term. In the medium term, the focus 
should be on informal bilateral and multilateral formats. 
 
After a difficult divorce, the UK has compre-
hensively separated from the EU. Although 
a complete break in the form of a “no-deal 
Brexit” was prevented, the Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement (TCA), concluded 
at the end of December 2020, seals a hard 
Brexit between the EU and the UK. New 
trade barriers have been erected, and the 
difficult situation in Northern Ireland has 
already led to further political tensions 
between the UK and the EU. 
At the same time, many elements call for 
close cooperation with London in foreign 
and security policy: geographical proximity; 
shared values, interests, and challenges; 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and other international 
organisations; (still) close economic ties; 
as well as cultural and personal relations. 
A major challenge for the German govern-
ment is thus to closely associate London 
into European foreign and security policy 
without damaging the EU in the process. 
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Self-promotion As a Global Leader 
Then-Prime Minister Theresa May had 
already launched the narrative of Global 
Britain to frame post-Brexit British foreign 
policy (SWP-Comment 24/2018). Her suc-
cessor, Boris Johnson, wants to assert the 
UK as an independent global leader after 
Brexit. 
With the Integrated Review, the Johnson 
government concretised its idea of Global 
Britain in March 2021. It builds upon four 
main aspects: 1) a more active use of part-
nerships and alliances, 2) the UK’s role as 
a “global champion of free and fair trade”, 
3) an independent foreign policy that inte-
grates research and development, develop-
ment cooperation, and “soft power”, 4) a 
security and defence policy with global 
reach. 
The level of ambition of Global Britain 
is (rhetorically) high: The UK sees itself as a 
“game changer nation”, “an even stronger 
force for good in the world”, and a “science 
and tech superpower”. After leaving the EU, 
it wants to take independent decisions on 
international issues – for example, as a 
pioneer against climate change – and also 
be an agenda setter, such as when it im-
posed swift sanctions against Belarus in the 
summer of 2020. 
A global foreign policy 
The UK government is building its Global 
Britain ambition first on the UK’s ongoing 
excellent foreign policy network. Due to 
Brexit, London loses direct access to the 
EU, and thus no longer participates in the 
regular exchanges of EU heads of state and 
government, foreign ministers, or at the 
working level. Yet, by global standards, 
London maintains a privileged position in 
international diplomacy. It remains a per-
manent member of the UN Security Council 
with veto power, a member of the G7/G20, 
the Organization for Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe, the Council of Europe, 
NATO, and in flexible formats such as the 
E3. Internationally, it has one of the largest 
diplomatic networks. In addition, it has tra-
ditionally close relations with the United 
States (US) and, within the framework of 
the “Five Eyes”, with Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand. 
The biggest contradictions in the Inte-
grated Review, however, are political. For 
example, the Johnson government has 
decided to cut the budget for development 
assistance from 0.7 per cent to 0.5 per cent 
of GDP. This weakens the British soft power 
and reliability emphasised in the Integrated 
Review in a central area and contradicts the 
narrative of Global Britain’s worldwide and 
comprehensive commitment. Moreover, 
in the Integrated Review, the UK proclaims 
the goal to strengthen multilateralism but 
it leaves out the EU as a partner. However, 
many of the UK’s goals will require coopera-
tion not only with European states, but also 
with the EU, such as in the area of sanc-
tions. 
Independent network of 
trade agreements 
A separate network of global trade agree-
ments is to form the second pillar. One of 
the main reasons why Boris Johnson opted 
for a hard Brexit (and twice voted against 
Theresa May’s withdrawal agreement) was 
the goal for the UK to negotiate its own 
trade agreements. Outside of the EU, Lon-
don can no longer throw the weight of the 
EU’s internal market into the balance when 
negotiating trade agreements, but as the 
world’s sixth-largest economy, it is con-
vinced that it can get agreements that are 
better tailored to the British economy. 
Additionally, London wants to strengthen 
the World Trade Organization and the 
multilateral trading system. 
In practice, the British government has 
successfully translated most existing EU 
trade agreements into its own arrangements. 
In consequence, about 57 per cent of the 
UK’s own exports in goods (as of 2019) are 
now covered by some form of trade agree-
ment. However, the TCA with the EU covers 
46 per cent of British exports in goods – an 
area where trading has become significantly 
more difficult due to Brexit – and all other 
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new trade agreements account for only 
slightly more than 11 per cent, for example 
Japan, South Korea, and Canada. Looking 
ahead, the UK is in negotiation with, among 
others, the US, India, Australia as well as in 
talks for the UK to join the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP). If all of these efforts 
were successful, they would cover another 
30 per cent of UK exports in goods. The 
CPTPP, in particular, is indeed different to 
the EU and would complement the UK’s 
symbolic military engagement in the Indo-
Pacific with a trade policy element. 
However, these are relative successes 
since, with very few deviations, they are 
“rollover agreements” of those already 
negotiated with the EU. So far, the UK has 
not concluded any agreements beyond what 
it already had as an EU member. Moreover, 
the EU remains by far the most important 
trading partner. On balance, trade from 
the UK to the world has thus become more 
restricted since Brexit due to a massive 
increase in new bureaucracy and non-tariff 
trade barriers facing UK exporters to the EU. 
A sovereign foreign policy 
The third pillar of “Global Britain” foresees 
independent foreign policy initiatives. All 
EU member states pursue their own inde-
pendent foreign and security policies; yet, 
since leaving the EU in January 2020, the 
British government has aimed to explicitly 
differentiate itself from its EU partners by 
pursuing its own priorities. 
First, this is visible with regard to China. 
For example, the British parliament has im-
posed a ban on the installation of Huawei 
5G infrastructure from September 2021 
onward. Following China’s crackdown on 
its former colony of Hong Kong, London 
has offered visas with the prospect of Brit-
ish citizenship to all Hong Kong residents. 
With an eye on the Biden administration, 
London wants to show toughness towards 
China and is positioning itself as the most 
important European partner to the US. 
At the same time, London outlines a 
“balanced” approach in the Integrated 
Review, according to which China is a sys-
temic challenger and the “biggest state-
based threat to the UK’s economic security”, 
but which also recognises that China and 
the UK benefit from bilateral trade and 
investment and that China needs to be on 
board for global challenges such as climate 
change. Thus, like the EU, London wants to 
combine cooperation and competition with 
China. For example, in parallel to the EU, it 
imposed sanctions on China in March 2021 
based on human rights violations, while 
also remaining interested in a trade agree-
ment similar to the China-EU Comprehen-
sive Agreement on Investment. 
Second, under the narrative of a tilt to 
the Indo-Pacific, the UK aims to increase its 
political, economic, and military engage-
ment in the region. For instance, a Director-
General for Indo-Pacific was created in the 
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development 
Office (FCDO) in 2020. In 2021, the British 
aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth will be de-
ployed to the Indo-Pacific. The aspiration 
to join the CPTPP completes the picture. 
Finally, the UK is hosting in 2021 the 
COP26 climate summit in Glasgow and 
holds the G7 presidency. In climate issues, 
the UK has every right to present itself as a 
pioneer, having formulated stricter climate 
targets than the EU, which, although it has 
long championed strict international cli-
mate targets, still falls behind the UK in 
this area. Together with the UN, it wants 
to negotiate a major breakthrough in inter-
national climate policy in Glasgow under 
British leadership. Within the G7 presidency, 
London is also emphasising its sovereign 
global role. Her Majesty’s Government is in-
creasingly using the G7 as a foreign policy 
forum, for example with invitations to 
Australia, India, and South Korea as well as 
with the joint declarations of the G7 foreign 
ministers – including the EU High Repre-
sentative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy – for example on Myanmar, Hong 
Kong, or the Russian military build-up on 
the border with Ukraine. 
With these initiatives, London aims to 
position a sovereign, agile Global Britain as 
a positive alternative to its caricature of the 
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EU as ponderous and inflexible. Seemingly, 
for post-Brexit British foreign policy, stronger 
global influence from London and close 
cooperation with the EU would be mutually 
exclusive. Although this narrative seems 
convincing at the rhetorical level, it is prac-
tically untenable. Engagements such as 
initiatives in the G7 presidency or coordi-
nated human rights sanctions against China 
would all have been possible within the 
framework of the EU. Instead, not being an 
EU member – in addition to the current dys-
functional relationship with the Union – 
weakens London’s room for manoeuvre as a 
self-declared champion of multilateralism. 
From technology regulation to climate 
change, British priorities would be easier 
to achieve with the EU than without it, let 
alone against it. 
A global security and 
defence actor 
Security and defence policy is a fourth cen-
tral area for London to underline its aspi-
rations for global leadership. It aims to 
strengthen existing alliances, launch new 
cooperation initiatives, expand its interna-
tional presence, and modernise its armed 
forces. London is focussing on global 
deployability with an emphasis on mari-
time capabilities, digitalisation, and the 
integration of new technologies. 
The strengthening of alliances mainly 
concerns transatlantic relations and NATO. 
London insists even more strongly on NATO 
(rather than the EU) as the primary forum 
for military political coordination. How-
ever, this needs to be accentuated with a 
certain British tendency towards bi- (for 
instance with France) and multilateral for-
mats (such as the UK Joint Expeditionary 
Force). In fact, the recently decided expan-
sion of the navy, the focus on new tech-
nologies, and the “tilt” towards the Indo-
Pacific do not follow a logic that was 
coordinated with NATO, but rather an 
uncoordinated sovereign prioritisation. 
Moreover, London wants to increase its 
international presence and agility and 
intensify partnerships outside of Europe 
as a sign of its global outlook; above all 
with the states of the Five Eyes; with Singa-
pore, Australia, Malaysia, and New Zealand 
in the Five Powers Defence Arrangement; 
but also with other ASEAN states, Japan, 
South Korea, and India, as well as with part-
ners in the Middle East and Africa. 
The UK has the world’s fourth-largest de-
fence budget (according to the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies), meets NATO’s 
2 per cent defence spending target, the 20 
per cent investment target, and in Novem-
ber 2020 increased the defence budget by 
an extraordinary £16.5 billion over the next 
four years. The current £41.5 billion de-
fence budget is expected to grow by 0.5 per 
cent above inflation each year. However, 
there is still a substantial funding gap in 
the 2020–2030 equipment plan. 
This increase of the defence budget is 
also a signal to Washington that London 
wants to remain militarily relevant and a 
leader in Europe. In addition to increasing 
the ceiling for nuclear warheads for its 
nuclear deterrent and expansion of its navy, 
the UK wants to improve its cyber and 
space capabilities and integrate new tech-
nologies into the armed forces. At the same 
time, the Euro-Atlantic engagement is to 
remain a priority (at least in the medium 
term): According to the Integrated Review, 
Russia is the “most acute” threat. In the 
long term, however, the Pacific region will 
become crucial. 
The Integrated Review and its military 
implementation (“Defence in a Competitive 
Age”) only partially answer several ques-
tions. First, even with the increase in the 
defence budget, the UK will not be able to 
act on its own globally; the British aircraft 
carrier in the Indo-Pacific, for example, 
requires a US escort. The global outlook 
could also lead to a reduction in capabilities 
that, according to NATO, are needed in 
Europe, for instance land forces. The army 
is to be cut from a planned 82,000 to 72,500 
personnel in 2025 (SWP-Aktuell 101/2020). 
With the tilt to Asia, London is gaining 
global visibility militarily, but its presence 
there does not have the same strategic in-
fluence that its military capabilities have 
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for Europe’s defence, where they (still) play 
a key role. 
Rejection of the EU As a Foreign 
Policy Partner and Actor 
So far, the British government has rejected 
foreign and security policy cooperation 
with the EU. Although cooperation with 
individual EU states, particularly France 
and Germany, has been largely successfully 
decoupled from Brexit, cooperation with 
the EU as an institution has suffered sig-
nificantly. In January 2020, Prime Minister 
Johnson signed the (legally non-binding) 
political declaration on future EU-UK rela-
tions together with the withdrawal agree-
ment. Among other things, it stated the 
goal of a close “security partnership”. This 
was to include regular exchanges in for-
eign, security, and defence policy; coordina-
tion on sanctions; and the participation of 
the UK in Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) operations. 
Nothing of this remained in the negotia-
tion of the future 2020 relationship. A few 
days after signing the political declaration, 
the British government published its nego-
tiating mandate, in which it no longer en-
visaged institutionalised cooperation with 
the EU in the field of foreign and security 
policy. The word “defence” and references 
to cooperation in this area were missing. 
Subsequently, although a supplementary 
agreement on the exchange of confidential 
information was attached to the TCA, co-
operation in foreign and security policy is 
entirely missing. There are no plans for an 
exchange on these issues in the EU-UK 
institutions created by the TCA, such as the 
EU-UK Partnership Council. Although US 
Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently 
attended the EU Council of Foreign Minis-
ters as a guest, London rejects this form of 
cooperation. 
In the Integrated Review, London also 
omits the EU as a partner in foreign and 
security policy; it is mentioned only as a 
partner in climate policy. Moreover, the 
FCDO has denied the EU ambassador in 
London diplomatic recognition, arguing 
that this would set a precedent for other 
international organisations. This is not very 
convincing, especially since not only do all 
the other third countries with EU delega-
tions (140 of them) recognise their ambassa-
dors, but the UK also worked with the EEAS 
until it left the EU. In his speech at the 
Munich Security Conference in 2021, Boris 
Johnson outlined a “Global Britain” that 
advocates the strengthening of the West 
and the multilateral world order, but in 
which the EU does not feature in foreign 
and security policy. 
The outlook for defence policy is similarly 
bleak. The EU offered the UK to participate 
in CSDP operations or projects of the Per-
manent Structured Cooperation under the 
regular conditions of third countries. Even 
the US is now seeking the latter. The British 
government, however, has rejected all pos-
sibilities. 
The British-European divide 
The British change of position in foreign 
and security policy with the EU can be 
largely explained by its domestic political 
dynamics. Here, the hard Brexiteers pre-
vailed in 2019. After taking office, Boris 
Johnson filled his cabinet exclusively with 
Brexiteers, who, like Foreign Minister 
Dominic Raab, had spent their political 
careers fighting for Brexit. Although the 
EU is of such central importance in trade 
policy and internal security that the UK 
will inevitably have to come to terms with 
it, the Union remains weak in foreign, 
security, and, above all, defence policy. 
London is therefore counting on being 
able to bypass the EU in this area, largely 
without consequences, and instead coordi-
nate directly on a bilateral and multilateral 
basis, especially with France, Germany, 
and, to a lesser extent, Poland and the Nor-
dic states. This focus on alternative, more 
flexible formats can be interpreted as an 
attempt to further weaken the EU in for-
eign and security policy. This not only 
misses an opportunity for urgently needed 
positive cooperation between the EU and 
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the UK, but it also increases the risk of 
Europeans being divided by third parties 
such as Russia, China, or in particular cases 
even the US. Moreover, non-coordinated 
actions such as sanctions lose part of their 
effectiveness. This also creates the risk that 
the UK will slowly but surely drift from its 
European partners in foreign and security 
policy. 
However, the EU is also a difficult part-
ner with regard to defining foreign and 
security policy cooperation with the UK. 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) is at odds with bilateralisation, 
cherry picking, and the exclusive use of 
flexible formats. The EU mandate for future 
relations, while aiming at cooperation in 
this area, emphasised above all preserving 
the EU’s “decision-making autonomy”. The 
UK was only offered participation options 
in EU decisions as a regular third country, 
comparable to Norway, which is hardly 
compatible with the UK’s foreign and secu-
rity policy weight and its self-image. 
Possible Formats 
As a consequence, cooperation between the 
UK and EU countries in foreign and security 
policy currently takes place primarily in 
flexible formats. These can be used by Ger-
many and others in their mutual interest 
of keeping London within the European 
framework on international issues, of pre-
venting external attempts at division, and 
at the same time maintaining links to the 
EU. The following formats are the most 
promising. 
The currently much-discussed E3 format 
of France, the UK, and Germany originated 
in 2003 during the negotiations on the nu-
clear agreement held with Iran, but it had 
lost visibility thereafter. Since 2016, its im-
portance has increased: It is seen as a way 
to ensure foreign policy coordination 
between the three big European countries 
despite Brexit, to give impetus to the weak 
CFSP, and to coordinate the difficult inter-
actions with former US President Donald 
Trump. Meetings became more frequent, 
the range of topics broadened (beyond EU 
issues: from the South China Sea to the 
poisoning of former agent Sergei Skripal), 
defence ministers also met, and partners 
were involved. The E3 format allows Lon-
don to be linked to EU decisions without 
an institutional agreement and to coordi-
nate positions (beyond EU issues) and joint 
action. 
However, non-involved EU states fear an 
exclusive and non-transparent format that 
threatens to undermine European unity, 
fails to take into account the interests of 
other states, or even dictates decisions as 
a directorate. To counter these fears, the 
nuclear negotiations with Iran were linked 
to the EU through the strong role of the 
High Representative, but he has been mis-
sing in the most recent revitalisation. It is 
also important to prevent London from 
labelling a successful E3 as a failure of EU 
foreign policy and from fuelling the rejec-
tion to work directly with the EU. 
In terms of results and acceptance, an 
issue-specific temporary extension of the E3 
seems to be the most promising approach: 
E3+X. When debating the Eastern neigh-
bourhood, Poland could participate, for 
example. For EU-NATO cooperation, E3 + 
NATO Secretary General + EU High Repre-
sentative would make sense. Berlin and 
Paris should also push to associate the High 
Representative in order to strengthen the 
EU’s legitimacy. He could represent the 
interests of the EU and act as a “watchdog” 
for the positions of the other EU states. 
The Quad – in this case Germany, 
France, the UK, plus the US – has worked 
well in the past at the level of the political 
directors to ensure information exchange 
and coordination. Since US Secretary of 
State Blinken took office, the four foreign 
ministers have also met several times in 
a Quad formation, for example on Iran, 
Myanmar, and China. 
As with the E3, the challenge for the 
Quad is that other EU states are criticising 
their lack of participation, most notably 
Italy, Poland, and Spain. They rightly point 
out that on certain issues, they can bring as 
much or more influence or expertise to bear 
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as the E3, for example with regard to the 
Southern neighbourhood. The US has long 
avoided the term “Quad” for fear of such 
complaints. London’s focus on the E3 and 
Quad seems to point to a British under-
standing of politics that relies on the US 
and large states instead of looking for 
relevant actors on an issue-by-issue basis. 
Berlin should not adopt this interpretation. 
Rather, it should insist on a temporary, 
issue-specific expansion of the Quad, as in 
the case of the E3, therefore ensuring the 
inclusion of the interests of the partners 
and the EU. 
At the global level, the G7 is another 
flexible format for coordinating foreign and 
security policy. London is using the format 
for that function during its 2021 G7 presi-
dency, an approach that the new adminis-
tration in Washington eventually supported. 
The advantage here is that the EU is already 
a G7 member, and the High Representative 
was also involved in the G7 Foreign Minis-
ters’ Declarations. After the UK, Germany 
will take over the G7 presidency in 2022 
and could continue to use the format for 
foreign and security policy. 
NATO remains the central military 
policy forum for European and transatlan-
tic coordination. It is in the mutual interest 
of Germany and the UK to keep Britain as a 
strong and reliable partner in the Alliance. 
From a German perspective, EU defence 
initiatives support NATO obligations and 
increase Europe’s capacity to act. NATO-EU 
cooperation should thus be used to link the 
UK with EU defence. However, attempts to 
undermine EU defence initiatives or to play 
off the EU and NATO against each other 
must be prevented. 
In parallel, Germany should strive 
for bilateral coordination with London 
where it suits its own interests and 
strengthen it through regular exchanges. 
For example, bilateral and minilateral talks 
with the UK could be used to flank EU 
decisions on sanctions. London has sought 
closer bilateral relations since the Brexit 
referendum, not least because it assumed 
that Berlin can significantly influence EU 
negotiations (and EU policies in general). 
Germany, on the other hand, has made a 
point of prioritising cooperation with the 
EU-27 and preventing the impression that 
bilateral cooperation could undermine EU 
cooperation. The German government 
wanted to avoid weakening the EU, 
straining the deteriorated relations with the 
UK any further, and being taken in by a 
British narrative that presents a false 
dichotomy between a toxic EU and positive 
bilateral relations. 
Now that Brexit has been completed, 
Germany should be more open towards 
intensifying bilateral cooperation with 
London, including signing the long-planned 
joint declaration on foreign and security 
policy. Particularly in this realm, the EU’s 
decision-making autonomy is hardly at risk. 
Rather, both Germany and the EU have an 
interest in coordinating with London, as 
long as this takes place in addition to EU 
coordination, and not instead of it. 
Ad hoc coordination with the EU: 
Finally, Germany should work to ensure 
that all flexible possibilities for EU-UK co-
ordination are explored, despite the diffi-
cult relationship between the EU and the 
UK. A model here could be, of all things, 
the increasing coordination with the US. 
Just like the visits of the US president and 
the Secretary of State to the European 
Council and the Council of Foreign Minis-
ters, the British foreign minister could be 
invited for consultations on dealing with 
Russia or on how to proceed in the Indo-
Pacific. Such ad hoc formats could grad-
ually restore trust and underline the ben-
efits of mutual coordination on specific 
issues without restricting EU decision-
making autonomy or British sovereignty. 
Conflicting Goals in View of 
Future Cooperation 
Linking the UK in EU foreign, security, and 
defence policy cooperation presents Ger-
many in particular with several dilemmas. 
Two interests have become contradictory 
due to Brexit and must now be balanced: 
On the one hand, the UK remains an im-
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portant partner with whom Germany 
shares many interests, values, and chal-
lenges; on the other hand, Britain’s ideo-
logically driven fundamental rejection of 
foreign and security policy cooperation 
with the EU is currently complicating co-
ordination immensely. As long as the 
British government fundamentally rejects 
cooperation with the EU, partners such 
as Germany and France will be forced to 
choose between coordination in the EU and 
bilateral or multilateral cooperation with 
the UK. In view of the hardened positions, 
these conflicting goals will almost certainly 
not be solved in the short term. 
In the medium term, therefore, “adhocism” 
and cooperation in smaller formats (such 
as the E3) will dominate. Informal contacts 
between the UK and the EU – as well as 
between the UK and individual EU states – 
will have to suffice, as will issue-based co-
ordination in the case of common interests, 
such as on sanctions. However, the difficult 
EU-UK relationship also limits bilateral co-
operation, because the more the EU-UK con-
flict escalates – for example on Northern 
Ireland or vaccine distribution – the more 
difficult it will be for Germany and other 
EU states, such as Ireland, to maintain nor-
mal relations with London. At the same 
time, successful cooperation in the medium 
term (for instance in the E3 or bilaterally) 
can create reliable working relationships, 
(re-)build trust, and produce positive results, 
thus establishing the foundation for long-
term institutionalised cooperation. Ger-
many should encourage all other EU states 
and lead by example so that they mutually 
inform each other about bilateral coopera-
tion with the UK to prevent them from 
being played off one another by London. 
Thematically, there is significant agree-
ment between the EU as a whole, Germany, 
and the UK on most of the foreign policy 
dossiers. Cooperation is possible and desir-
able, for example on COP26, Iran, and 
Russia. In a few areas, however, the poten-
tial for conflict is high, especially with 
regard to trade policy, regulatory issues, 
and pandemic-related topics (vaccines). 
These issues, however, threaten to domi-
nate the current strained relationship, as 
the present conflict over the Northern 
Ireland Protocol shows. 
The long-term goal should be a normalisa-
tion and institutionalisation of EU-UK rela-
tions. However, this would require greater 
openness on the part of the EU, a change in 
London’s political position, a more success-
ful EU foreign policy that makes the Union 
a more attractive partner, or a change in 
the international security situation that 
requires increased cooperation. The super-
election year of 2024, in which the US, the 
UK, and the EU will vote and potentially 
reposition themselves, could pave the way 
for a qualitatively new EU-UK relationship. 
Until then, Germany should focus on 
ensuring close coordination with London 
through regular exchanges in bilateral and 
minilateral formats as well as NATO, but it 
should place these at the service of strength-
ening the EU’s foreign and security policy. 
Any attempts by London to use smaller 
formats against the EU or play EU states off 
each other – thus weakening or disparag-
ing the Union – must be resisted. Medium-
term cooperation, therefore, explicitly in-
cludes a management of expectations that 
cooperation with London risks being diffi-
cult for the foreseeable future. 
Dr Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the EU / Europe Research Division at SWP. 
Dr Claudia Major is Head of the International Security Research Division at SWP. 
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